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To the Victors Belong the Spoils: How the United States and Cuban Elites
Undermined the Ideals of the Raceles Nation and Cuba Libre (1898-1913)
In Cuba there is no fear of a war of
races. Man is more than white, more
than mulatto, more than Negro. On the
battlefields of Cuba, white and blacks
have died and their souls risen together
to heaven. In the daily life of defense, of
loyalty, of brotherhood, of cunning, besides
each white man, there was always a Negro.
- José Martí, “My Race.”
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Writing in 1893, José Martí described
Cuba as a raceless nation, devoid of racial
prejudices or racial tensions. Martí asserted
that Cubans had overcome their racial
differences, joining together to fight a
common enemy. He adopted the ideals of
the raceless nation, rejected Spanish rule
and associated colonialism with slavery,
adopting the ideals of (free Cuba) in an
effort to combat the disunity that had
divided insurgents in the Ten Years’ War
(1868-1878), and the Guerra Chiquita or
Little War (1879-80).1 The ideals of Cuba
Libre also figured prominently in Marti’s
vision for the nation; one in which Cuba
was free from Spanish rule, dependence
upon United States economic interests, and
the dominance of the planter class.
Support for Cuba Libre emerged prior
to the Second War of Independence
(1895-1898) as a reaction to Spain’s
manipulation of racial fears to undermine
prior independence movements. The
raceless nation signified different things to
diverse sectors of Cuban society. Varying
imaginings of what Cuban meant emerged,
all justified by the rhetoric of Martí’s
raceless nation.2 Insurgent victory appeared
certain in 1898 despite rebels’ revolutionary
post-independence vision. The United
States, alarmed at the prospect of losing
Cuba to the insurgents, intervened in
1898, frustrating the Cuban independence
movement once again.
The racial rhetoric that unfolded during the
liberation movements was distinct from the
racial ideas held by the intervention forces.3
Cuban intellectuals attempted to overcome
racial intolerance whereas in the U.S. the
“color line” became more rigid.4 Jim Crow
Laws prevailed in the U.S at the same time
Martí claimed that “In Cuba there is no
fear of a war of races” and that a “man has
no particular rights because he happens
to belong to a particular race.”5 Racial
classification in Cuba also differed from

racial categorization in the United States. A
two-tier racial system existed in Cuba, where
blacks, mulattos and whites were separated
by visible characteristics, instead of the
one-drop rule that existed in the U.S.6 Thus,
in Cuba race was a fluid concept, whereas
in the U.S. race was a binary construct
and an individual was categorized either as
“black” or white. How did the occupation
of Cuba by a nation whose rigid color ideals
encouraged racial segregation impact the
emerging social unity and raceless rhetoric in
the island? My research examines the impact
of the U.S. occupation (1898-1902) on
ideas of patria (motherland) and Cubanidad,
(what it meant to be Cuban) by analyzing
how notions of race in Cuba changed
during the U.S. occupation and intervention
(1906-1909). This study is guided by three
questions: how did the U.S. occupation
inform notions of race and nationhood; how
did the U.S. imperialist ideas shape what it
meant to be Cuban; and did the American
racial rhetoric result in increased repression
of Afro-Cubans and contribute to the racial
backlash of the 1912 Race War?
Cuban sovereignty depended upon the
nation’s ability to prove itself civilized
and capable of protecting foreign
property. However, the American Military
Government (administering the island
from 1898-1902) viewed most Cubans,
particularly Afro-Cubans, as backward and
promoted white interests. This allowed
white Cuban elites to utilize the U.S.
occupation and intervention in pursuit
of their particular vision of Cubanidad
in which they would occupy positions
of power. They adopted American
racial rhetoric to justify their notions
of Cubanidad, which ensured the social
hierarchy remained intact, undermining
the ideals of the raceless nation. Cuban
elites opposed all manifestations of the
raceless nation and suppressed “barbaric”
traditions (Afro-Cuban cultural practices),
while seeking American support for their
vision of modernity. The exclusion of AfroCubans from positions of power during
the initial years following independence
lead to armed protest in 1912. In turn, the
1912 Race War was met with repression
and violence from the Cuban army as the
U.S. stood by and did nothing. American
approval of white Cuban elites’ actions
further marginalized Afro-Cubans who
were denied access to positions of power in
23
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order to demonstrate that the nation was
capable of governing itself. The exclusion
of Afro-Cubans served two purposes; it
prevented lower class Cubans from coming
to power and it protected the planter
class, which Cuba Libre was intent on
destroying. Elite attempts at excluding
blacks were derived from the fear that if
the lower classes came to power they would
implement Marti’s vision of Cuba Libre,
which threatened the survival of the planter
class as well as U.S. interests. Therefore,
Cuba Libre simultaneously threatened the
planter class and the United States.
The Independence Movements
The Ten Years’ War was led by a small
group of eastern creoles who, frustrated at
the lack of Spanish political and economic
reforms, invited their slaves to join them in
seeking political independence.7 The Grito
de Yara, proclaimed by Carlos Manuel de
Céspedes, liberated slaves and invited them
to “conquer liberty and independence for
Cuba.”8 A manifesto from October 10,
1868 suggests that insurgent leaders did
not support abolition in the early phases of
the war. Rather, the manifesto declared that
all men were equal, but did not incorporate
abolition into the formal objectives of
the movement.9 Such contradictions were
attributed to the need to attract the support
of Afro-Cubans, who were crucial for the
war, and slaveholders, whose support was
essential to fund the insurgency.10 The
abolition policy adopted by white leaders
was limited, albeit it “rai[sed] the issue of
the social question and arou[sed] with their
conduct the spirit of people of color.”11
Economic and political dissatisfaction was
manifested differently in the eastern and
western regions of the island. There was
greater variety in the agricultural economy
in the east, with sugar estates existing
alongside tobacco and coffee farms.12
Planters cultivated smaller plots of land,
relied less upon slave labor, and were more
likely to be affected by fluctuations in the
economy than their counterparts in western
Cuba. Consequently, there was greater
support for the insurgency in eastern
Cuba. Expansion in the nineteenth century
promoted the growth of the sugar industry
and ingenios (sugar mills) expanded across
the western provinces.13 There was greater
fear of black rebellion in the west because
planters’ livelihoods were tied to slave labor.
A large portion of the plantation workforce
in the western provinces was comprised
of slaves and planters feared a slave revolt.
This resulted in stronger ties to the colonial
24
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regime and less inclination to support the
insurgency.
Afro-Cubans embraced the insurgency
and some like Antonio Maceo emerged as
leaders in the independence movement. In
doing so, they began to view the movement
differently - as one not just to achieve
independence, but also to abolish slavery.
The Spanish government called attention
to the prominence of black leaders as proof
that an independent Cuba would become
another black republic, like Haiti. AfroCuban participation in the Liberation Army
increased, augmenting white fears of a
black movement that threatened the social
order of Cuba.14 For these reasons, AfroCuban leaders like Maceo were suspected of
attempting to create a black republic when
he requested 500 men to invade the western
region of the island. The invasion never
occurred because insurgent leaders feared
that Cuba would “share the fate of Haiti
and Santo Domingo.”15 Thus, racial fear
confined the independence movement to the
eastern region of the island.
Tension amongst insurgents, low morale
after years of fighting, economic hardships
and white fear of Afro-Cuban participation
in the insurgency further fractured the
liberation movement. On February
8, 1877, rebel leaders accepted the
conditions of the Pact of Zanjón. However,
insurgents, many of them Afro-Cuban,
continued to fight for Cuba Libre in the
eastern provinces under the leadership
of Antonio Maceo, who denounced the
committee’s actions as “shameful,” and
refused to acknowledge the pact without
independence and the abolition for all
slaves.16 Afro-Cubans continued to wage
war against the Spanish until May, when
Maceo surrendered and left the island – the
Ten Years’ War finally came to an end.
Peace on the island was disrupted once
again on August 24, 1879, when dissatisfied
patriots from the Ten Years’ War led a
new independence movement, the Guerra
Chiquita or the Little War. It appealed to
slaves who had not taken up arms in the Ten
Years’ War and who viewed independence
as a means to abolish slavery.17 Afro-Cubans
constituted a large proportion of the rebel
forces since many “former insurgents and
slaves” joined the new movement, making
the new insurgency “blacker” than the first.18
At the same time, many white separatists
from the first war condemned the new
rebellion, declaring that they opposed any
“threat to liberty.”19 Because it attracted

such a large proportion of Afro-Cubans, the
Guerra Chiquita lacked the support of many
white veterans who had fought in the Ten
Years’ War.
Spain utilized the insurgents’ “blackness”
to argue that the movement’s goals were
not to create a sovereign nation but to
transform Cuba into a black republic - one
whose very existence threatened Cuban
society.20 These fears played a part in the
movement’s leader Calixto Garcia’s decision
to appoint a white leader instead of Maceo,
who had previously led the rebel forces in
Oriente province. The appointment of a
white leader was a way not to “give credit
to [Spanish] assumptions” that it was a race
war.21 Nonetheless, the Spanish government
sought to shape the composition of
the rebellion by “remo[ving] the white
element” from the rebellion and pressuring
white leaders to surrender.22 In this way,
the insurgency became more black and
Spanish claims appeared more plausible.23
Spanish propaganda divided insurgents
by highlighting the fragmentation of the
rebellion, and manipulated racial fears
by depicting Afro-Cuban rebels as “men
exempt from any sense of honor and
humanity.”24 Afro-Cuban rebels were
portrayed as criminals and murderers
seeking to massacre whites and rape
women.25 Such claims brought racial fears
to the forefront and prompted whites to
reject the insurgency precisely because it
was predominantly black.

Figure 1
(Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y
Deporte) 26

To achieve political independence Cuba
had to address the racial tensions that
had divided her during the preceding
independence movements. For this
reason, the rhetoric of the raceless nation
targeted the stereotypical depictions
of Afro-Cubans used to create panic
amongst white Cubans. For example,
Spanish newspapers portrayed the typical
insurgents as apes (Figure 1), suggesting
that rebels were predominately black as
well as primitive and uncivilized. These
depictions of Afro-Cubans during the
Ten Years’ War exploited white fears of
a race war, discouraging whites from
joining the insurgency. In this way, the
struggle for independence evoked the
threat of Cuba becoming a black nation.
A successful independence movement
needed to refute claims of racial strife and
articulate a new rhetoric that unified the
island by advocating for the inclusion of
all Cubans. Intellectuals, among them José
Martí, emphasized that blacks were not a
racial threat because they were “grateful
recipients of white generosity.”27 The new
rhetoric asserted that whites had redeemed
themselves for enslaving blacks and that
Afro-Cubans had overcome the legacy of
this enslavement because “racial equality
[was] the foundation of the new Cuban
nation.”28 Claims such as “I am white,
but before that…I am a Cuban who loves
la patria [the motherland]” appeared in
the Cuban newspaper La Prensa.29 The
rhetoric of the raceless nation argued that
racial identity was not a crucial component
of Cubanidad.30 Rather, to highlight a
particular racial group was unpatriotic
because, according to José Martí, to be
Cuban meant being “more than white,
more than mulatto, more than Negro.”31
Not only did Martí affirm that Cuba was
a raceless nation, but he also articulated
a vision for an independent Cuba, one in
which Cuba would be free from Spanish
political control and the United States’
economic influence as well as free from
racial discrimination. Martí’s vision of a
Cuba Libre united black and white Cubans
against a common Spanish enemy. Cuba
Libre came to mean not just independence,
but also social justice and as well as a
“means of redemption.”33 In this way,
independence was described as “breaking
the colonial chains” (Figure 2). The new
rhetoric implied that Afro-Cubans had
been oppressed in the same manner that
the Cuban nation was subjugated to Spain.
Political freedom meant both political
liberty and an end to racial discrimination
for all Cubans. The promise of freedom

economic and political interests; therefore,
the U.S. administration sought ways to
stall the Cuban triumph. According to U.S
officials, “Cuba was far too important to
be turned over to the Cubans.”38 In March
1898, the U.S. minister to Spain declared
that the insurgency was “confined almost
entirely of negroes,” then warned that
Cuban independence would result in a
“second Santo Domingo.”39 In April 1898,
President McKinley requested permission
from Congress to intervene and stop
hostilities between Spain and Cuba.40 The
United States went to war in May and by
December 1898, Spain had surrendered
to the United States after ceding Cuba to
U.S. troops.

Figure 2
(University of Miami Library) 32
appealed to blacks and many of the popular
classes who joined the movement in the
hopes of achieving these goals. Unity
would be paramount in the Second War of
Independence, which began on February
24, 1895. Its success hinged upon a
successful island wide revolt. In the east,
the insurrection quickly spread, meanwhile
rebels targeted the western provinces where
the previous revolts had failed.34 By 1896,
the Liberation Army advanced on Havana
and threatened the survival of the planter
class. The support from different sectors of
Cuban society strengthened the nationalist
movement allowing the Liberation Army to
take control over much of the island.35 By
spring 1898, the rebels were on the verge
of victory.
The United States Intervention
With victory in sight, the ideals of Cuba
Libre loomed in the horizon. Aware that
Spain was “too feeble to hold them,” as an
editorial cartoon in the The Washington Post
declared in 1896, and not willing to allow
the island to become sovereign, President
William McKinley began negotiations with
Spain to acquire the island.36 However,
Spain had no intention of transferring
Cuba to the United States and it soon
became clear that the island was in danger
of falling into Afro-Cuban hands. There
were two options: U.S. intervention or
Cuban independence.37
A free Cuba challenged American

The image of the Cuban rebel and of
Cubans changed after the intervention,
from the valiant oppressed insurgent
to one “absolutely devoid of honor or
gratitude.”41 Before the intervention,
newspapers and magazines in the
U.S. portrayed Cuban insurgents as
(typically white) heroes fighting against
an oppressive Spain.42 In 1898, a Los
Angeles newspaper The Herald described
the Cuban insurgent as “the type of
southern gentleman before the war- brave,
courteous… proud of pure Spanish blood
in their veins” and who was now growing
“impatient of restraint, to gain the fullest
freedom.”43 After the intervention, Cuban
insurgents were described by U.S. military
officers as “turbulent and illiterate negroes
needing the government of a stronger
race.”44 The well-known Afro-Cuban
insurgent leader, Antonio Maceo, was
described by The Herald as the “only one
of the Cuban generals who had negro
blood in his veins,” but emphasized
that he was “well educated and quite a
scholar.”45 A new narrative of the Cuban
independence wars was needed to justify
continued U.S. occupation of the island,
one that highlighted Cubans’ inherent
racial shortcomings.

Figure 3:
(Library of Congress) 46
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Before the U.S. intervention, Cubans were
depicted as honorable (white) men, and
after, as ungrateful blacks who needed
better qualified men to govern the island.
In part, this was because insurgents were
much darker than the U.S. had anticipated
the U.S. sought ways to minimize their
role in the war. Their ragged appearance
and their support for Cuba Libre justified
the marginalization of the Liberation
Army’s rank and file (Afro-Cuban) soldiers.
The prevalent belief was that blacks were
uncivilized barbarians who should not
participate in, much less govern, Cuba.
For this reason, the U.S. troops prevented
rebel soldiers from entering Santiago
after the surrender of the city, since they
could not be trusted not to attack whites
or to “plunder” and “pillage” the city.47
The army was accused of not “[appearing
even capable of helping themselves when
others try to help them” as well as of
having a “native character” marked by
“innate duplicity.”48 After the intervention,
propaganda depicting Cuba as a white
woman begging Uncle Sam to rescue her
from the “famine,” “war,” and “revolt”
disappeared (Figure 3). Instead, U.S.
newspapers began to emphasize how Cuba’s
racial composition made it suitable for
political independence.
Intervention was justified in terms of
ensuring the triumph of Cuba Libre,
whereas before it had been necessary as a
way to stop the Spanish from oppressing
Cubans. In this context, the U.S.
occupation “became a selfless service for the
cause of humanity,” and Cuban insurgents
should be grateful of the sacrifices made
by the U.S. forces to liberate them.49
Insurgent leaders received the occupation
forces with “distrust and doubt” rather
than the enthusiasm Americans had
expected.50 Stephen Crane remarked
“The American soldier thinks of himself
as a disinterested benefactor…he does
not want to be thanked, and yet the total
absence of anything like gratitude makes
him furious.”51 Cubans were portrayed as
“shirkers and slackers” and the rebels as
ungrateful for the help provided in securing
independence, which Cubans had been
unable to achieve on their own.52 The
liberation movement was accused of “being
possessed but with one idea- the idea that
we [Americans] had come to Cuba to free
them and to feed them. They had therefore,
nothing else to do.”53 American soldiers
asserted that a minority of rebel soldiers
fought valiantly alongside the U.S. troops
but that most Cuban insurgents “[did] as
little fighting as they could.”54 The idea that
26
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the U.S. had liberated Cuba was further
proof that Americans should take control
of the island. After all, to the victor belong
the spoils.

many Cubans was in the hands of U.S.
officials and Cubans of the “better classes”
were in no position to advocate for AfroCuban interests.60 U.S. policies benefited
Cuban elites politically and economically;
therefore, elite Cubans who may have
advocated for Afro-Cubans’ interests did
not do so. It was not in the best interest
for white Cubans to support Afro-Cubans’
demands for racial equality or to support
the ideals of the raceless nation.61
Undermining the Raceless Nation

Figure 4:
(Library of Congress) 55
Cuba’s racial dynamics became a
determining factor in the island’s
independence, since the U.S. perceived
Cubans to be unable to protect U.S.
interests. Afro-Cubans could not be trusted
to govern the nation and protect U.S.
interests, thus Cuba’s sovereignty was not
recognized by the U.S. administration
after the Second War of Independence.56
The U.S. first needed to pacify the island
and second assure that the right Cubans
were elected into office before they would
leave. Cuba required saving not only from
“Spanish misrule” but also from anarchy
(Figure 4). This idea that Cuba needed
protection from herself, particularly from
its black population, from Spanish tyranny,
and from bad government guided U.S.
policies on the island. American authorities
hoped to promote a political atmosphere
in which real Cubans (white elite proAmerican Cubans) would take leading
roles in the new republic.57 According to
Governor General Leonard Wood, “only
the ‘ignorant masses,’ the ‘unruly rabble,’
and ‘trouble makers,’” advocated for
independence and opposed intervention.58
Real Cubans had not articulated their
visions for the Cuban nation; when they
did so, they would support American
annexation.59 The U.S. concluded that it
was their duty to restrain the masses from
participating in the government, ensuring
that “real Cubans” could implement their
vision for the nation.
U.S. officials supported white Cubans’
position at the apex of the political
hierarchy, which gave elite Cubans access
to the structures of power. At the same
time, the independence wars resulted in
economic ruin for many planters in Cuba.
The economic and political standing of

The independence wars did not culminate
in an “independent, socially egalitarian, and
racially inclusive” Cuba as many Cubans
had hoped.62 Instead, members of the
Liberation Army were dismissed with only
seventy-five pesos to travel back to their
homes, and whites who had supported
the Spanish government continued to
be employed in the same positions they
had occupied prior to independence.
After the war, some Afro-Cubans accused
white elites of “[taking] over the business,
factories, and public jobs, that [blacks] had
just brought to independence.”63 AfroCubans insinuated that they had the right
to these positons because they had taken
arms in the name of racial equality. U.S.
interests were also protected by giving
property rights to foreigners.64 The military
government implemented discriminatory
policies targeting Afro-Cubans at a time
when they had the opportunity to attack
the racial inequalities inherent in postindependence Cuba.65
The American occupation undermined the
ideals of the raceless nation by favoring
white Cubans in employment and politics.
U.S. policies openly discriminated against
Afro-Cubans, and the most prestigious
jobs were closed to non-whites.66 For
example, only 7 percent of jobs in central,
provincial and municipal administrations
were given to Afro-Cubans. Likewise, of
the 8,238 policemen registered 21 percent
were Afro-Cuban, of 5,964 teachers, 439
were Afro-Cuban and of 205 government
officials, 9 were Afro-Cuban.67 Blacks also
faced discrimination by the adoption of
suffrage laws requiring voters be literate,
own property worth $250 or more, or have
served in the Liberation Army. As a result,
only 19 percent of Afro- Cuban males voted
in 1901 despite making up 37 percent
of the male citizens.68 Secretary of War
Elihu Root explained that the suffrage laws
were to exclude the “mass of ignorant and
incompetent” so that a “conservative and
thoughtful control of Cuba by Cubans” may

be promoted. Candidates running for the
municipal elections that had been endorsed
by the U.S. were not elected, which was
seen as a demonstration of Cubans’ flawed
judgement in that they could not be trusted
to choose “the best men.”69
Cuban cultural traditions were also under
U.S. scrutiny during the intervention
and occupation of the island. Cultural
expressions, particularly Afro-Cuban
traditions that appeared “barbaric
or uncivilized” such as cockfighting
or dancing el danzón, attested to the
“characteristic” and “degenerate” nature of
Afro-Cuban culture.71 Suppressing Cuban
cultural practices that appeared backward
were necessary so that the military
government would deem that Cubans were
educated, modern “citizens” who were also
“deserving of their own government.”72
This understanding of civilized behavior
vilified Afro-Cuban cultural expressions.
Cubans were depicted in newspapers as
black children forced to abandon their
uncivilized ways (Figure 5 shows how
Americans imposed modernization through
the forceful disinfecting of the nation).
Those who engaged in these primitive
behaviors risked showing the occupation
forces that Cuba was not ready to take her
place among other modern nations. Thus,
Cuban elites utilized the U.S. fear of a
separate Afro-Cuban movement to curb
their demands for the implementation
of the rights implicit in the ideals of the
raceess nation.

Figure 5
(cited in Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share)70
Dissatisfaction was high among AfroCubans, especially among those who
had fought in the war. Participation

in the liberation movement had given
Afro-Cubans new expectations derived
from the rhetoric of the raceless nation
and Cuba Libre.73 The expectations were
unrealized but Afro-Cubans were unwilling
to demand their rights because to do so
would result in accusations of undermining
the ideals the raceless nation. There was
little improvement in education or job
opportunities for Afro-Cubans after
independence. Only 26 percent of AfroCubans over the age of 10 could read in
1899, as opposed to 44 percent of whites.74
Some teachers prevented Afro-Cubans from
entering their classrooms despite official
integration of the educational system and
universities did not allow black students
to enroll.75 Darker-skinned Cubans lacked
the educational foundation to participate
in more prestigious or remunerative
occupations. These inequalities were
evident in that, for example, the same
percent of Afro-Cuban women worked
in low-skilled jobs such as laundresses,
servants, peasants, and dressmakers in 1907
as in 1899.76 Discontent increased amongst
Afro-Cubans over the discrepancy between
the claims of the raceless nation and
reality. Cuban elites were oblivious to the
plight of Afro-Cubans and used the U.S.
occupation as a way to silence their protests
against the inequalities that persisted after
independence. Afro-Cubans who lost their
jobs embraced the white-led rebellion that
occurred as a result of the Moderate party’s
antics in 1906.77 By September 1906, as
many as 25,000 Afro-Cuban veterans had
joined the Liberal’s movement, known
as the August Revolution, in trying to
overthrow the Moderate party from
power.78
The August Revolution prompted the
second U.S. intervention (1906-1909).
American journals and magazines portrayed
blacks in the insurgency as a threat to
the future of the nation. In 1906, the
Minneapolis Journal declared that the
rebellion was made up of men “whose
trade is revolution. Stable government
does not satisfy them” and therefore “the
preservation of Cuban independence even
if a temporary occupation of the island
by American troops is necessary.”79 The
Washington Times suggested that insurgency
was unavoidable since “patriots denied
there was any danger of a race question”
but “secretly they realized an impending
evil, an inexplicable danger from the black
man.”80 It also warned that the “black
man” entering the capital “in a startling
military uniform of his own creation,
lacking only the white plumes to give him

the appearance of a Haitian general” was
out to “overwhelm the pure white race.”81
The specter of the threatening Afro-Cuban,
and the prospect of a black republic was
once again brought forth to instill fear in
white Cubans. Moreover, the threat posed
by Afro-Cubans also justified a second
intervention, since the Platt Amendment
gave the U.S. rights to intervene to protect
U.S. property and businesses. To quiet the
masses, the provisional government gave
white veterans public jobs and General
José Miguel Gómez promised that AfroCubans would be favored if he were elected
president.82
It was clear by 1906 that the Liberal
party would not fulfil their promises to
Afro-Cubans. The idea of a black party
advocating for Afro-Cuban representation
gained momentum by 1907, since Liberals
had “betrayed” Afro-Cubans during
the second intervention by failing to
recommend blacks for public jobs as they
had promised, and by telling U.S. officials
that Afro-Cubans were “extreme radicals.”83
Afro-Cubans turned their attention to
gaining access to public jobs through the
creation of a black political party. This
resulted in Evaristo Estenoz and Gregorio
Surín forming the Partido Independiente
de Color, or Independent Party of Color
(PIC) on August 7, 1908. Although the
PIC demanded equal political rights for
blacks and their integration into society,
it also appealed to mulattos and a small
segment of whites.84 In an effort to quell
whites’ anxiety over black mobilization,
Previsión, the party’s newspaper, addressed
the most common fears − the creation
of another Haiti, and the depiction of
Afro-Cubans as uncivilized.85 Previsíon
refuted the claims that Afro-Cubans were
attempting to construct a black republic
by highlighting the need for a black party.
According to the party platform, blacks
needed representation because Cuba was
discriminating against blacks in the same
way the United States did.86 The PIC
asserted that political parties attempted to
“[discredit] the black masses” by depicting
Afro-Cubans as uncivilized in the eyes of
the provisional government.87 They also
insisted that Afro-Cuban stigmatization
was meant to serve as encouragement
for anti-black policies from the U.S.
provisional government.88
Independientes (PIC supporters), promoted
a positive Afro-Cuban racial consciousness
by encouraging black pride. While this did
not directly challenge the rhetoric of the
raceless nation, it did encourage blacks to
27
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celebrate cultural and political expressions
that were exclusively Afro-Cuban.89 The
PIC modified Martí’s raceless nation by
going beyond the idea that the island
was “for whites and blacks” and claiming
that to be Cuban could also mean being
black.90 Letters written to Previsión thanked
Estenoz for creating a newspaper solely for
Afro-Cubans, something that was “ours,
without mixing or blending with foreign
bodies,” while other letters claimed it was
“time that you show what you are as a black
and Cuban woman.”91 For these AfroCubans, Cubanidad meant taking pride in
being black and taking part in the republic
as a Cuban citizen who had earned equal
rights.
The PIC also renounced claims that Cuba
had achieved racial equality after the
wars of independence as a way to attract
supporters and defend the party’s goals and
demands. The Party’s newspaper challenged
the depiction of the “typical” Cuban
(represented by the cartoon character
Liborio) by creating a black cartoon
character (José Rosario) who refuted the
claims of Liborio.92 José Rosario described
how Liborio betrayed the pact the two
had sworn when Liborio, out of fear of the
other man, allied with the United States at
the end of the war.93 The cartoon illustrated
how white Cubans betrayed the promises
made during the independence wars and
how as a result racial equality did not exist
after independence. Therefore, AfroCubans had the right to mobilize and assert
their interests through the PIC.
Afro-Cuban participation in the August
Revolution, combined with the PIC
demands for equal rights for Afro-Cubans
threatened the political equilibrium on
the island. Cuban elites responded to this
danger by adopting a series of measures
to undermine Afro-Cuban mobilization,
which included labeling the PIC a racist
movement.94 They spread rumors that
the Partido Independiente de Color was
anti-white, anti-Cuban, and unpatriotic
as a way to undermine the party.95 The
PIC was a threat to the ideals of the
raceless nation because it advocated for the
interest of a single racial group. A Cuban
pamphlet described the August Revolution
as having been started by the “butchers
of Africa” who hoped to take revenge on
whites.96 Afro-Cubans were accused in The
Washington Post of “[looking] upon the
white man as his natural enemy.97 Based on
these accusations the Liberal party drafted a
proposal in congress to disband the PIC on
the grounds that it was racist. The Morúa
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Amendment argued that the PIC promoted
the interests of Afro-Cubans and that it
marginalized whites. Nonetheless, Estenoz
continued to refute allegations by claiming
to be driven by “concern for peace and
equality” for all Cubans.98
The Cuban government accused PIC
members of organizing against whites in an
effort to disband the party and to weaken
their support. Yet, no substantial proof
was presented in the trials of PIC members
in 1910 and the witnesses questioned did
not admit to hearing any conspiracies
against white Cubans.99 The threat of black
mobilization led by the PIC served several
purposes, one of which was to create alarm
in Washington and subsequently prompt
another U.S. intervention.100 Some Cubans
privately complained to U.S. officials
about the ineffectiveness of the Cuban
government and warned of possible threats
to U.S. interests on the island.101 Such
threats to American property obligated the
Cuban government to take action or risk
another intervention.102
Cuban newspapers played a crucial role in
how the PIC was perceived by other Cubans
and the United States. Panic spread across
the island in 1910 as newspapers depicted
rural towns and white women as susceptible
to “warlike mobilization” by both the PIC
and Afro-Cubans.103 Newspapers printed
stories in which dangerous blacks roamed
the countryside targeting whites, much
like the Spanish had depicted the black
rebel insurgents during the Ten Years’ War.
By 1912, headlines such as “The Racist
Revolution” and the “Racist Uprising”
were being printed by major newspapers
on the island.104 This state of panic gave the
government the opportunity to mobilize
popular opinion against the Partido
Independiente de Color and to discredit
Afro-Cuban demands for positions in the
government. The government targeted the
party and used racial stereotypes to instill
greater fear in the population, expediting
whites’ fear of a black-led rebellion.105 At
the same time, U.S. newspapers warned
that “Cuba [was] still on trial before the
world…If it convicts itself of incapacity for
self-rule once more and compels against its
fate hereafter should independence be finally
be taken away from it.”106 The exaggerated
stories printed by the press swayed public
opinion against the PIC , whereas in the
U.S. the PIC and claims of a race war were
tantamount to Cuba’s inability to maintain
a stable government without foreign
intervention.

The Cuban government adopted a threestep strategy to undermine the PIC
and Afro-Cuban demands for greater
political participation. The provincial
governors in Cuba were directed to
question independientes partaking in any
“unusual movements.”107 In April 1912,
the government dispatched troops to Santa
Clara and Oriente because these provinces
were allegedly at higher risk of rebellion.108
Afro-Cubans suspected of being PIC
members were arrested at the end of April
and beginning of May.109 These actions
gave credence to the rumors circulating
of blacks attacking whites and heightened
whites’ fears. Meanwhile, newspapers
claimed that Cuba was becoming a black
nation.
The party remained outlawed despite
independientes’ efforts to revoke the Morúa
Amendment in time for the November
1912 elections.110 Independientes warned
that they would take action if the Cuban
Congress or the United States did not
recognize the PIC by April 22, 1912.111
In the last weeks of May, PIC supporters
threatened foreign interests on the island,
and on May 31 and June 1 they protested
by burning buildings.112 Newspapers
claimed independientes’ actions were part
of a race war allegedly carried out by the
PIC. According to the Cuban newspaper
El Dia, it was “an uprising of blacks, in
other words, an enormous danger and a
common danger” that would result in “the
free and beautiful America defending herself
against a clawing scratch from Africa.”113 The
protest preyed upon preconceived racial
fears of blacks as barbarians whose goal
was to control the island. Fear of another
Haitian Revolution, this time in Cuba,
also gave credence to claims that the PIC’s
armed protest was in fact a race war.114
Some American newspapers even claimed
that Haitians and Jamaicans were active
participants in the armed protest, basing
their allegations on the foreign sounding
names of some PIC leaders.115 Newspapers
in the U.S. described Evaristo Estenoz as
“the same vainglorious negro” who had
led the earlier insurrection and whose
followers were “extorting tribute from
peaceful merchants and traders.”116 The
PIC was denounced as racist by Cuban and
American newspapers for taking action and
demanding that the ideals of the raceless
nation be implemented.
Many of the troops dispatched to Oriente
in response to the fear spreading across
the island were white.117 The Cuban

government encouraged the formation
of voluntary militias (voluntarios), who
along with the Army, persecuted AfroCubans in Oriente, and often “[did not]
respect at all the people of color and
threaten them insolently without thinking
of the serious conflict that their behavior
could produce.”118 Afro-Cubans with no
affiliation to the PIC were targeted because
of their skin color when voluntarios, the
Cuban army, and U.S. officials did not
distinguish between Afro-Cubans and
independientes.119 Such an incident occurred
in May 31 when General Carlos Mendieta
attacked a group of Afro-Cubans living in
La Maya, killing 150 Cuban peasants with
no ties to the PIC.120 Independientes burned
houses, the post office and the railway
station in La Maya in reprisal.121 Rumors
spread that PIC supporters had burned
down the entire area and repression against
all blacks increased.122
Rumors of black mobilization and the
possibility that Afro-Cubans might attack
U.S. property reached the American
government in June.123 Approximately
1,000 Marines were sent to protect U.S.
property and mines, and three more
warships joined the three ships already
anchored in Santiago and Guantánamo to
protect railroads and foreign property.124
The presence of U.S. military personnel
contributed to the violence that spread
across the region by allowing voluntarios
and the Army to focus on repressing the
PIC members, rather than protecting U.S.
lives and property.125 It also pressured the
Cuban government to take additional
measures asserting control of the situation.
This was necessary to ensure another
intervention would not occur. Greater
repression against Afro-Cubans was
justified because of the perceived threat to
U.S. lives and property.”126 A New York
newspaper, The Sun, for example, stated
“if the young republic does not rapidly
put down the negro insurrection… and
demonstrates that the lives and property
of Americans and other foreigners are safe
throughout the island, Uncle Sam will do
it for her.”127 The possibility of Afro-Cuban
mobilization justified the U.S. involvement
and served as an opportunity for the Cuban
government to eliminate the PIC.
Newspapers in the U.S. had assured readers
that no intervention was forthcoming
“unless a state of anarchy is threatened”
on the island.128 By June, rumors of blacks
threatening property and “sugar mills…
flaming in eastern Cuba” ran rampant in
the U.S. and Cuba.129 Yet, some newspapers

warned that many of the stories in the
Cuban press were over-exaggerated. The
Nation denied that the uprising was racially
motivated, instead affirming that it was
“mainly political, the negroes desiring to
form a party of their own, and to run an
independent candidate for the presidency.”
Blacks were “persuaded” to protest because
they have “not been sufficiently considered
in the distribution of offices.”130 The
newspaper also informed readers that the
uprising was led by Haitian and Jamaican
immigrant workers taking advantage of
labor shortages on the island.131
Military personnel in Cuba believed
all Afro-Cubans to be potential PIC
supporters.132 For this reason, Afro-Cubans
were treated without mercy regardless of
whether there was proof of their affiliations
with independientes.133 The U.S. consul
admitted that in Santiago “many innocent
and defenseless negroes in the country
[were] being butchered.”134 Moreover,
the French consul accused voluntarios
and the Cuban army of arbitrarily killing
blacks not because they were suspects
but because “they want a war. They want
targets,” and they will massacre “poor very
peaceful wretches whose only crime will
be not being born white.”135 Newspapers
described corpses being left in the open
and rebels being “bound hand and foot
and tied together with a big rope” before
being taken by the police.136 In response to
the brutality, PIC supporters attempted to
garner U.S. support by contacting officials
and denouncing the slaughter of innocent
Afro-Cubans. For example, Evaristo
Estenoz demanded that the U.S. send
representatives to the region who could
directly report the atrocities committed by
the Cuban army against innocent people
of color.137 His message was ignored by the
U.S., despite the protection of “property,
life and liberty” guaranteed by the Platt
Amendment.
The Cuban government augmented the
fear of blacks and slaughtered innocent
Afro- Cubans. The New York Times stated
that on July 2, 1912 a “special cable” was
sent to the newspaper assuring Americans
that “the negro uprising [was] definitely
put down” and guaranteeing that the rural
guards and guerillas would continue to seek
insurgents until the “last rebel hiding in the
mountains was either captured or killed.”138
Any Afro-Cuban could be accused of
being a “rebel” because it was difficult to
distinguish between PIC members and
innocent Afro-Cubans. Leaders of the
rebellion, amongst them Estenoz, and

Pedro Ivonnet, were killed for allegedly
attempting to escape arrest.139 Other blacks
were accused of “conspiring against the
republic” and were transported to Havana
for trial.140 Approximately 5,000 to 6,000
rebels were killed in 1912, although reliable
numbers are not available. In contrast, a
total of 16 members of the Cuban armed
forces were killed.141 Thousands of AfroCubans were murdered during the 1912
Race War for claiming the rights they were
entitled to in the raceless nation.
Most people on the island were aware of
the atrocities committed against AfroCubans in 1912, yet did nothing to stop
innocent blacks from being targeted.142
For many Cubans, the indiscriminate
killings and repression against blacks were
far removed events that did not affect
their everyday life. Some U.S. citizens
living in Cuba were not only aware of
the repression, but also approved of the
repressive tactics used. A U.S. citizen
in Oriente declared that “the army and
the volunteers have lopped the heads of
probably some six thousand negroes in the
province and the rest as whole have had
the fear of God drilled into their souls.
I believe the remedy was necessary and
effective.”143 While another admitted that
“some innocent heads may have fallen, in
the main there have been few sacrificed
at a loss to the country-and the effect has
been salutary.”144 Newspapers criticized the
Cuban government’s use of the rebellion to
further political goals, but none objected to
the massacre of Afro-Cubans.145
The U.S. administration also received
reports from the consul in Santiago
describing the events that occurred in the
region. Descriptions of the “race war” sent
by the U.S. consul communicated that
Afro-Cubans were being targeted because
of their skin color and not because
they were mobilizing against whites.146
The problem of the independientes was
best solved by the death of PIC leaders
and their supporters, despite the U.S.
consul acknowledging that PIC goals
were not to “take up arms against the
government” but “to secure a redress
of their grievances or repeal of the
Morúa Law through concerted action
in demonstration of revolutionary
character.”147 The Day Book commented
in regard to the 1912 rebellion that
“Cuba’s got to be a conservative republic
even if we have to shoot her full of radial
holes.”148 Newspapers and magazines in
the U.S. and Cuba openly discussed the
atrocities committed against Afro-Cubans
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establishing that the U.S. government was
aware of the repression occurring in the
island.
Cubans had come together to fight for a
raceless nation, but were divided by the
policies implemented after independence.
The U.S. occupation and intervention
failed to bring about the implementation
of Cuba Libre. Afro-Cubans, acting
upon the rights presumably they had
earned during the liberation movement,
protested their lack of political rights.
Having risen up in armed rebellion, they
made themselves vulnerable to racial
accusations. The fear of blacks attacking
whites was augmented by political pressure
from the U.S, who threatened another
intervention to ensure the protection of
foreign property. White Cubans, urged
by self-interest, further increased fear of
blacks in 1912 to justify the repression of
a black-only political party. This allowed
them to eliminate political competition
and to undermine Afro-Cuban demands
to positions of power.
Racial Inequality and the U.S.
Intervention
The elite eastern planters who led the
Ten Years’ War in 1868 promised slaves
equality and insinuated that they would
be emancipated if they took up arms in
support of a free Cuba. Afro-Cubans who
fought in the Ten Years’ War adopted the
claim that Cubans were equal, regardless
of race, to demand emancipation as
one of the movement’s goals. Although
vaguely promised, the prospect of eventual
emancipation drew large numbers of AfroCubans into the Liberation Army, giving
rise to the perception that the insurgency
was predominantly black. Anxiety over
blacks taking part in an armed protest,
particularly in western regions of the island
where a large percent of the work force was
enslaved, spread amongst white Cubans.
The Spanish government was able to utilize
the fear of a black republic and the threat
posed by Afro-Cubans to undermine
the rebels’ objectives. Division amongst
black and white insurgents resulted in
negotiations with Spain in 1878 to end
the war, but Afro-Cubans in the eastern
regions continued to fight for Cuba Libre.
Dissatisfied patriots from the Ten Years’
War also led a new rebellion in 1879.
Afro-Cuban participation in the Guerra
Chiquita surpassed that of whites, since
many white veterans failed to support the
Little War. Therefore, the insurgency was
blacker than the Ten Years’ War, which
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allowed the Spanish government to portray
it as a threat to Cuban society and to the
entire nation. This made it possible for
the Spanish government to suppress the
insurgency in less than a year.
Independence leaders fashioned a
new image for black insurgents prior
to the outbreak of the Second War of
Independence in 1895. Afro-Cubans were
portrayed as submissive and beholden to
whites for granting them their freedom.
In formulating the concept of the raceless
nation, Cuban independence leaders were
counteracting the racial tensions exploited
by the Spanish government in the Ten
Years’ War by reassuring white Cubans
that blacks posed no threat. According
to José Martí, racial integration had been
achieved in the Ten Years’ War when blacks
and whites, fighting together, had died
for Cuban independence. By 1898, many
sectors of society supported the ideal that
Cubans, regardless of their racial or social
class, could cooperate with one another to
create a nation free of foreign influence and
racial injustice.
This rhetoric alarmed the U.S. and
the Cuban planter class because the
implementation of Cuba Libre threatened
Cuban elites as well as U.S. hegemony.
Therefore, the United States followed the
near triumph of the liberation movement
in Cuba with alarm. Spain’s inability to
control the insurgency, her refusal to
allow the U.S. to purchase Cuba, and
the imminent triumph of Cuba Libre
left the U.S. administration with two
choices: intervention or independence.
However, American involvement needed
to be justified. Intervention was deemed
necessary so that Americans could aid the
unjustly oppressed (white) Cubans.
The racial composition of the Liberation
Army was not what the U.S. forces
had expected. American soldiers were
confronted by ragged Afro-Cuban
insurgents, rather than the army of
white Cubans they had imagined. AfroCubans were deemed incapable or unable
of governing an independent Cuba,
necessitating the construction of a new
narrative – the ungrateful and incompetent
Cuban soldier incapable of achieving
independence without outside assistance.
Cubans were no longer depicted as heroic
men and women, but as lazy blacks devoid
of honor and incapable of self-government.
Their racial identity was linked to American
preconceptions of African-Americans. The
racialized portrayal of Cubans allowed

the U.S. administration to discredit the
independence movement since a large
proportion of the rebels were black. AfroCuban rebels would not be allowed to take
control of the island and Cubans, who were
backwards, uncivilized and whose blood
was intermixed with blacks, needed U.S.
help in governing the nation.
Policies implemented by the U.S. military
government assisted white Cubans in
securing political power and ensured
that Afro-Cubans were denied positions
of power. Suffrage laws, Afro-Cuban
cultural repression, and U.S. endorsement
of white Cubans safeguarded the social
hierarchy the raceless nation claimed
to have been fighting against. AfroCuban cultural traditions, deemed too
uncivilized for modern times, were also
dismissed as unpatriotic. The Second
War of Independence did not culminate
in a nation free from racial segregation
or foreign interest. Instead, racial
inequalities persisted in educational and job
opportunities. Frustrations increased at the
lack of opportunities for Afro-Cubans who
had fought in the liberation movement, yet
had earned few rights after independence.
In 1905, Afro-Cubans joined whites in the
August Revolution, protesting the loss of
public jobs and political power at the hand
of the Moderate party. This new insurgency
triggered the second U.S. intervention
from 1906 to 1909. U.S newspapers
described the revolution as a race war and
Afro-Cubans as threats to the island. Once
again, blacks were depicted as a menace to
the nation and as standing in the way of
progress.
It was clear by 1905 that Afro-Cubans
would not be awarded the rights the
independence movement claimed they
had achieved, despite claims asserting
otherwise. Therefore, they formed the
Partido Independiente de Color (PIC)
as a way to organize and demanded
improved educational opportunities for
Afro-Cubans and better access to jobs in
the government - rights the raceless nation
declared they had earned. Rumors spread
across the island that the movement was
racist and unpatriotic since it attempted to
divide Cubans by skin color. Newspapers
accused PIC supporters of mobilizing
against whites, and the Cuban government
outlawed the party on the basis that it was
racist. The party remained outlawed despite
independientes’ efforts to revoke the Morúa
Law. As a result, PIC supporters gave the
Cuban government until April 22, 1912
to allow the PIC to participate in politics

on the island. Independientes threatened
U.S. interests in Cuba and burned several
buildings when their ultimatum was
ignored, which led to newspapers accusing
blacks of commencing a race war targeting
whites. The Cuban government, acting
upon the fear of black insurgents running
through the countryside assaulting whites,
dispatched troops to Oriente. Violence
against blacks escalated from then on, since
the Cuban army and voluntarios treated all
Afro-Cubans as potential PIC supporters.
Rumors and allegations of blacks targeting
foreign property reached the U.S. in
June, resulting in the dispatch of the
Marines to ensure American economic
interests were protected. The presence of
American forces in Cuba pressured the
Cuban administration to take more drastic
measures. For this reason, the repression
of the Afro-Cuban revolt was crucial to
expedite the U.S. departure from the
island. Intervention and the threat of a
third occupation triggered even more
repression towards Afro-Cubans. What
commenced as the Liberal party’s plan to
impede blacks from participating in Cuban
politics culminated in U.S. involvement.
The repression against Afro-Cubans and
the allegations against blacks, which were
manipulated by the Cuban authorities to
undermine the PIC’s claim to positions
of power, concerned Americans. Thus,
the suppression of Afro-Cuban demands
acquired new meaning during 1912 since
Cuba now had to assure Americans that it
could effectively repress the rebellion.

accusing them of racial discrimination
and by depicting blacks as a threat to the
raceless nation.
The United States intervention provided
elite Cubans with the opportunity to
undermine the ideals of the raceless nation
and Cuba Libre by adopting U.S. racial
rhetoric to marginalize Afro-Cubans. White
Cubans could argue that Afro-Cubans
should silence their demands for the sake of
not extending the U.S. intervention. They
also prevented Afro-Cubans and lower-class
Cubans from taking positions of power
as a way to forestall the implementation
of Martí’s vision for Cuba. Anyone who
subscribed to the notion of the raceless
nation was a potential threat to U.S.
interests and the elite planter class. For this
reason, Afro-Cubans were marginalized and
their demands for equality undermined.
The U.S. intervention provided Cuban
elites with the opportunity to solidify
their position at the top of the political
hierarchy. Black marginalization
contributed to the claim that Cubans were
not worthy of independence because they
had not fought to liberate their own nation.
Afro-Cubans had sacrificed little for their
nation, so it was not their place to demand
rights. Rather, U.S. forces alone had fought
and died to give Cuba its independence.
This justified the United States’ efforts to
undermine the ideals of the raceless nation
and Cuba Libre; after all, to the victor
belong the spoils.

Afro-Cubans were killed as American
military personnel stood by protecting U.S.
interests. U.S. officials were aware of the
indiscriminate killings of Afro-Cubans, but
they concluded that the simplest method
of resolving the political and social tensions
was to allow events to run their course.
Therefore, the U.S. did not condemn the
brutal massacre of approximately 5,000
to 6,000 Afro-Cubans. Blacks could
not criticize the death of Afro-Cubans
for fear that they too would be targeted
because they had little political support
from the government and were excluded
from positions of power. When AfroCubans protested their lack of rights,
they were depicted as unpatriotic. Cuban
elites had government support as well as
foreign aid, allowing them to subdue the
black insurgency they claimed threatened
Cubans. At the same time, white Cubans’
access to power was protected by U.S.
support. Elite whites ensured darker-skin
Cubans remained subjugated both by
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